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Constitutions, Democratic Self-Determination and the Institutional 
Empowerment of Future Generations: Mitigating an Aporia
by Michael Rose
A bstract: Is th e self-determ ination  the question misses the poin t. I t  is demonstrat- ations, i t  is shown that w e w ill always a ffect
/  I  o f  fu tu r e  generations im ped ed  by e d  that the very d em and  f o r  fu tu r e  generations’ them, a n d  that w e shou ld  employ an attitude
.JL J L  lasting constitutions, as Thomas f u l l  self-determ ination  is self-contradictory, o f  “reflectivepaterna lism ” towards them. With
Jefferson  suggests? In this a rticle i t  is n o t only a n d  that i t  is impossible to achieve. Apply- the help o f  institutions rev iew ed  in this article,
a rgu ed  that the opposite is true, bu t also that in g  the a ll-a ffected  p r in cip le to fu tu r e  g en er- the interests o f  fu tu r e  generations cou ld  be in-
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trodu ced  into today’s p o litica l decision-making 
process. The role o f  constitutions is to prov id e 
th e prerequisites f o r  dem ocratic self-determ ina­
tion a n d  poten tia lly also to fa cilita te th e insti­
tu tiona l em pow erm ent o f  fu tu r e  generations.
Introduction1
Lasting constitutions and the self­
determination of future generations are said 
to be in conflict, since future generations 
will be bound by laws they had no voice 
in and that can only be modified by super­
majorities, if  at all.2 Hence the democratic 
self-determination of future, i.e. yet unborn 
generations3 is a fragile value, for they will 
be affected by the policy impacts we be­
queath them. To restore future generations’ 
sovereignty, Thomas Jefferson unsuccessful­
ly insisted on limiting the legal force of laws 
to 19 years from their adoption onwards, 
including the constitution.4 
Before confronting Jefferson’s controversial 
claim, as I intend to do here, we first of all 
should analyse the underlying issue of future 
generations’ self-determination in greater 
detail. To this end, the so-called “all-affect­
ed principle” is employed to specify the 
notion of democratic self-determination 
regarding its normative democratic-theo­
retical basis, and the principle’s applicability 
to future generations is discussed. Showing 
that future generations indeed are affected 
by today’s laws and policies and that their 
right to self-determination is thereby in­
fringed, Jefferson’s proposition is taken up 
again and finally rejected. This is done by 
arguing that the perceived tension between 
constitutional and political stability on the 
one hand and the self-determination and 
sovereignty of future generations on the 
other is misplaced. On the contrary, at least 
stable constitutions can be understood as 
presuppositions of the self-determination 
of both present and future generations. It 
is argued that the demand for future gener­
ations’ full self-determination is inherently 
contradictory, for it presupposes the very 
ethically universalistic standpoint it seems 
to reject. Making this universalistic stand­
point explicit in turn helps to make the case 
for enduring constitutions. Furthermore, 
building on the analysis of the all-affected 
principle, it turns out that full self­
determination is per se impossible, resulting 
in an aporia, i.e. an insoluble problem that 
can be worked on and mitigated, none­
theless. Recognising this fact and shaping 
its consequences by mitigating the aporia is 
what I call “reflective paternalism”.
Following this, so-called “democratic pre- 
sentism” is briefly introduced as the main 
barrier to mitigate the aporia. Given dem­
ocratic presentism and employing the all­
affected principle, scholars and activists call 
for institutions to introduce the interests 
of future generations into today’s political 
decision-making process.5 In the second 
part of the article I will give a brief review 
of the relevant approaches and present 
s elected real-world institutions. Moreover, 
I will examine the potential roles of con­
stitutions and civil society actors in insti­
tutionally empowering future generations 
today and give some advice regarding 
possible real-world applications. Taking the 
Jefferson debate as a point of departure, I 
thus will firstly establish the aporia of future 
generations’ self-determination and second­
ly review approaches to mitigate it by insti­
tutionally empowering future generations 
today, thereby focusing especially on the 
(potential) role of constitutions.
Stable constitutions can be 
understood as presuppositions of 
the self-determination of both 
present and future generations.
Specifying democratic self-determination: 
the all-affected principle and its applica­
tion to future generations
A fruitful specification of democratic self­
determination is the so-called “all-affected 
principle”. This principle is central in dem­
ocratic theory, especially in participatory, 
deliberative and also representative models 
of democracy. The all-affected principle 
claims that everyone who will be affected 
by collectively binding decisions should be 
considered in these decisions.6 Or, as Nadia 
Urbinati and Mark E. Warren state with 
reference to modern political theorists like 
Dahl, Gould, Habermas, Held, and Young: 
“democracy [is] any set of arrangements that 
instantiates the principle that all affected by 
collective decisions should have an opport­
unity to influence the outcome.”7 “Democ­
racy [therefore] means em pow ered  inclusion 
o f  those a ffected  by co llective decisions”, as 
Warren and Castiglione define democracy.8 
For Anton Pelinka, the all-affected princi­
ple, as a defence against heteronomy, is an 
essential part of the basic ethics of democ- 
racy.9 The battle call of the American War 
of Independence “no taxation without rep­
resentation!” is an instance of the virtue of 
the all-affected principle, both in the history 
of ideas and in the history of the real world.
Is the all-affected principle applicable to 
future generations? The provisional an­
swer is yes. Future generations will inevita­
bly be affected by the collectively binding 
decisions made today, but they cannot raise 
their voice now, for the simple fact that they 
do not exist, yet. The members of future 
generations will be born tomorrow, or in 
one hundred years, and they will have to 
live with today’s political decisions and their 
impacts. This can be demonstrated easi­
ly. Jonas, Birnbacher, Tremmel, Leggewie, 
MacKenzie and others show that the human 
scope of action has extended greatly since 
the 20th century.10 We live, as Paul Crutzen 
claims in Nature, in the era of the Anthro- 
pocene.11 This is evident in the human 
capacity for global self-destruction with the 
help of NBC weapons, the human role in 
climate change, genetic engineering with 
irreversible impacts on the ecosystem, long­
term effects of nuclear waste disposal, and 
much more. In general, it is not even nec­
essary to evoke extreme cases such as those 
mentioned above. Indeed, every reasonable 
political decision will work into the future, 
and every law is made to bind the future.
First ob jection : fu tu r e  genera tion s w ill be 
better o f f
Nevertheless, the application of the all­
affected principle to future generations 
comes under pressure from two directions: 
In the first critique, Geoffrey Brennan ques­
tions the relevance of the problem by stat­
ing that “over the past three centuries or so 
it has been pretty much routine that each 
generation has done better than its prede- 
cessor.”12 The idea behind this statement is 
that future generations are only positively 
affected and that therefore the political con­
sideration of future generations is dispen­
sable. Having said that, even if there is an 
intergenerationally increasing prosperity, 
this does not suspend the all-affected prin­
ciple and its application to future genera­
tions, for an empirical argument cannot 
invalidate a normative argument. This can 
be easily illustrated by an analogy: from the 
perspective of democratic theory, a well- 
intentioned dictator is not democratically 
justified by the fact that he successfully 
cares for the material well-being of his 
subordinate citizens. From the perspective 
of the all-affected principle, both dictator­
ship and the exclusion of an affected group 
imply a democratic deficit.
Nevertheless, if  Brennan is empirically 
right, this would weaken the problem of
Intergenerational Justice Review
Issue 2/2016
future generations’ self-determination and 
the demand to mitigate it from an every- 
day-morality point of view. There are three 
points to be made here. First, even if Bren­
nan’s evaluation of recent history is right, 
this positive evaluation should not be uni- 
versalised and extrapolated.13 Many phi­
losophers as well as scientists do not share 
Brennan’s optimism regarding the future.14 
Second, the developments in recent history 
were contingent. The Cold War, for exam­
ple, could have become much more danger­
ous and destructive than it did. And history 
shows no linear positive developments in all 
cultures. Third, if we apply our definition 
of current and future generations, Brennan’s 
hypothesis does prove wrong if we refer 
t0 to, for example, the year of 1933 in 
Germany. The political decisions of the 
current generation (people alive at t  ) did 
affect large parts of the first future gene­
ration (people born shortly after t0) quite 
negatively.
S econd ob jection : fu tu r e  genera tion s w ill not 
be legally bound
In the second critique, Ludvig Beckman 
questions that future generations will be 
affected by policies in which they had no 
voice.15 For this purpose, Beckmann dif­
ferentiates the all-affected principle into 
two versions, using two interpretations of 
“being affected”: First, “A person is [...] 
affected by a decision to the extent that it 
has a causal effect on his or her welfare or 
opportunities”, or second, “the decisions 
made by governments and legislatures 
define the entitlements, duties and benefits 
that apply to th e subjects as a m atter o f  law”, 
i.e. being affected means being subject to a 
certain jurisdiction’s legal order.16 Scholars 
like Thompson or Dahl seem to prefer the 
second, legalistic, interpretation, whereas 
Goodin vehemently argues for the first, i.e. 
causal, interpretation.17
Future generations will inevitably be 
affected by the collectively binding 
decisions made today, but they 
cannot raise their voice now, for the 
simple fact that they do not exist, yet.
Beckman solely employs a strict legalistic 
interpretation of the all-affected prin­
ciple and states that the current generation 
cannot legally bind unborn persons, who 
therefore cannot be affected by today’s po­
litical decisions in this sense.18 An impor­
tant underlying condition of this proposi­
tion is Beckman’s understanding of liberal 
democracy. According to Beckman, the 
sovereignty is owned by the people, and 
the people exert its sovereignty, mediated 
through elections, through the majority of 
its representatives.19 So, future people will 
be democratically self-determined, and, as 
sovereign, they will have the right to active­
ly or passively approve or change the law 
by majority vote (or some qualified major­
ities).20 Beckman therefore argues that “the 
only laws that apply to posterity are those 
affirmed by future people themselves.”21 He 
closes his argumentation with the following 
statement: “Generations cannot rule one 
another; hence there is no basis for intro­
ducing the political representation of the 
unborn following the legal version of the all 
affected principle.”22
As a result, the intuitive argument that a 
legal order always binds not only current 
but also future citizens, and that the cur­
rent generation therefore wields power over 
future generations, is rejected by Beckman. 
However, Beckman’s conclusion is implic­
itly based on the premise that the lifetimes 
of members of the current generation will 
not overlap with the lifetime of members of 
future generations. But this understanding 
of generations is not a general consensus; it 
is abstract and impractical, and at the very 
least it is in conflict with the definition of 
future generations employed in this article. 
If we employ this article’s definition, we end 
up at a quite different evaluation of Beck­
man’s argument.
Beckman equates the sovereign with the 
majority of the representatives, and, via 
the electoral procedure, with the majority 
of the voters, since democratic elections are 
the mechanism through which the majority 
of representatives, elected by the majority 
of voters, legitimately exerts the sovereignty 
of the people.23 But every political decision, 
taken at t  , legally does not only bind the
population whose majority indirectly le­
gitimised the concerned decision. It also 
legally binds people born after t0, living in 
that jurisdiction. Those who are born after 
t0 are not part of the sovereign entity exist­
ing at t0. Furthermore, they will not become 
sovereign, that is democratically self-deter­
mined, for the time being, because they can 
neither actively nor passively make any ma­
jority decisions regarding the validity of the 
legal order adopted at t0. Solely a majority 
decision of the currently living is legitimate, 
according to Beckman.24 For a legitimate 
majority decision of the future contempo­
rary living, the people born immediately 
after t0 will depend in large part on the fu­
ture selves of current generation’s members, 
because the people born immediately after 
t0 will be a minority in the society existent 
soon after t  . Only after the point in time at 
which the people born after t  will outnum­
ber the people who were already alive at t0 
will the former be allowed to exert their sov­
ereignty. Up to that demographic turning 
point, the current generation will wield the 
same power over members of future gener­
ations that is negated by Beckman. Since 
every law is made to bind the future, at least 
those who are born timely after t0 should 
be considered in the democratic decision­
making process.
Having said that, if  one remains in Beck­
man’s shoes, one might still argue that the 
legalistic version of the all-affected principle 
should not be applied to later future gener­
ations that will come into existence in, say,
60 years.
Still, there is a further, rather empirical ar­
gument against Beckman’s claim: Beckman’s 
theoretical argument is far from realistic. In 
reality, politics is first and foremost inherit­
ed from the political ancestors, a fact that in 
turn strongly constrains the political scope 
of action of the present rulers.25 The assert­
ed self-determination of future people, be
time
legend
------future selves of the
present generation
------members of future
generations
gap of self­
determination 
regarding laws e[t<0]
Figure 1: Gap o f  self-determ ination, applying the legalistic version o f  the a ll-a ffected  principle. 
Source: own illustration
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they born shortly or a long time after t , is a 
very constrained form of self-determination 
from an empirical point of view.
[Politics] is first and foremost in­
herited from the political ancestors, 
a fact that [...] strongly constrains 
the political scope of action of the 
present rulers.
However, most of the literature on inter­
generational justice refers, be it implicitly 
or explicitly, to the causal version of the 
all-affected principle, which seems to be 
not only more intuitive and demanding, 
but also ethically superior.26 Policy outputs 
do not only have legal consequences for, but 
also causal impacts on future generations. 
Future generations will be affected by our 
political decisions, as we are affected by the 
political decisions of our ancestors.
Constitutions and the aporia o f future 
generations’ self-determination
According to the application of the all­
affected principle to future generations, 
Jefferson was right in being concerned 
about future generations’ self-determination. 
Limiting the legal force of laws (including 
the constitution) to 19 years is not a suit­
able solution, however.27 Hence Madison 
and others objected that this would bring 
about political and social instability and 
violence and would thwart long-term in­
vestments, obligations and progress.28 Fur­
thermore, it is argued against Jefferson that 
in order to change the norms of a political 
community one should be able to rely on 
already-existing, not expired institutions 
that regulate this process.29 Referring to Jef­
ferson’s calculation of the above-mentioned
19 years with the help of mortality tables, 
one could additionally argue that while cit­
izens are mortal indeed, societies are not, 
or at least not in the same way.30 The same 
should be true for society’s fundamental 
institutions.
Jefferson’s controversial claim illustrates the 
perceived tension between constitution­
al and political stability on the one hand 
and the self-determination and sovereign­
ty of future generations on the other.31 It 
should have become clear in the preceding 
paragraphs that this tension is somehow 
misplaced. As several authors convincingly 
argue, constitutions can be understood as 
a necessary precondition for the self-deter­
mination of both present and future gen- 
erations.32 Since constitutions establish the 
fundamental rights, obligations and insti­
tutions of democratic self-determination, 
destabilising those constitutions by tempo­
rally limiting their legal force purportedly 
for the sake of future generations’ self­
determination would also undermine the 
very value of self-determination we seek 
to save for them. We cannot create self­
determination tomorrow by jeopardising the 
working of democratic self-determination 
today. Instead, if we want to facilitate the 
self-determination of future generations, 
we should perpetuate the basic institutions 
of democratic self-determination and pro­
tect them by constitutional law against 
their misuse or abrogation. The right of 
self-determination is an essential element 
of liberal democratic forms of government, 
and this form of government is usually 
enshrined in the nation’s constitution.
The universalistic p rem ise o f  the claim  fo r  
fu tu r e  generations’ f u l l  self-determ ination  
Admittedly, this argument is based on 
the assumption that there are universal 
rights and values, one of these being “self­
determination”. Such universal rights are 
often placed beyond the reach of simple 
democratic majorities, since their source of 
legitimacy is not the affirmation by major­
ity, but, for example for Jefferson, natural 
law, or other universalistic ethical concepts. 
From this point of view, it seems to be
l egitimate to bind current and future ge­
nerations to these rights and values, and to 
establish basic institutions that are deter­
mined to guarantee them. Consequently, 
a special constitutional protection of these 
rights and institutions seems to be legi­
timate, too. However, both the very sub­
stance and the degree of abstraction of these 
constitutional commitments are disputed, 
and there are good reasons for keeping such 
constitutional regulations as parsimonious 
as possible in order to avoid unnecessary 
restrictions on future generations’ right of 
self-determination.
We cannot create self-determination 
tomorrow by jeopardising the work­
ing of democratic self-determination 
today.
If we would leave our universalistic stand­
point, we would eliminate the very problem 
of future generations’ self-determination 
at the same time. The claim not to bind 
future generations at all for the sake of their 
right of self-determination is inconsist­
ent and not thought through to the end.
First, if we would truly believe that we are 
not allowed to impose any of our values on 
fixture generations in order to allow them 
the full amount of self-determination, in 
doing so we would implicitly break our 
own rule and impose on them our values, 
specifically: the value of self-determination. 
How do we know that future people would 
like to be fully self-determined? Perhaps 
they will be happy with their heteronomy 
by their ancestor’s constitution; maybe they 
will appreciate having less choice. Second, 
if we guarantee the full self-determination 
of the next future generation, how do we 
safeguard the full self-determination of later 
future generations? By not binding the next 
future generation at all, they will be allowed 
to decide for themselves to bind and affect 
their next future generation as they please.33
In evitab le dependencies
What is furthermore often ignored is the fact 
that the problem of the self-determination 
of future generations is not so much a 
t rade-off between different values or aims 
but an aporia, an insoluble problem that 
can be worked on and mitigated, none­
theless. Like the present generation, future 
generations will never experience the f u l l  
amount of self-determination, since this 
would require a tabula rasa and the con­
currency of all people. But since time flows 
unidirectionally, there is an asynchronicity 
of being, and this brings about dependen­
cies of the present on the past, and of the 
future on the present, as was demonstrat­
ed in the analysis of the applicability of the 
all-affected principle to future generations. 
These dependencies include the very be­
ing and identity of future individuals (see 
non-identity problem34) and the political, 
ecological, economic and social living con­
ditions of future generations. We do affect 
the yet-unborn by our actions, policies, 
laws and constitutions, and there is no way 
out of this kind of paternalism. These man­
ifold dependencies yield various responsi­
bilities. Following Jefferson in focusing on 
constitutions as a perceived threat to future 
generations’ self-determination hence may 
obscure our view on the actual broader issue 
at hand.
Reflective paternalism and democratic 
presentism
If we acknowledge these dependencies 
and the concomitant paternalism, we are 
free to work on the aporia and to establish 
something I would like to call a “reflective
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paternalism” towards future generations. 
Reflective paternalism, reaching beyond 
the narrow constitutional problem, is an 
attempt to take into account future gen­
erations’ future right to self-determination 
today,35 knowing that we will always affect 
their lives, regardless of whether we ignore 
or reflect that fact. What this could mean 
in practice will be elaborated on in the next 
sections.
From this perspective, democratic pre- 
sentism, a rather unproblematic quality of 
modern democracies if we think that fu­
ture generations will not be bound by us,36 
becomes an obstacle to intergeneration­
al justice and hampers reflectively pater­
nalistic politics which may mitigate the 
aporia. According to the theory of dem­
ocratic presentism, “democracies are sys­
tematically biased in favor of the present.”7 
Democratic presentism has several mutually 
reinforcing causes: election cycles pressure 
the government to display political out­
puts, outcomes and impacts within the par­
liamentary term in order to increase their 
prospects of re-election.38 Human beings 
as such are said to be short-sighted and to 
unduly discount the future.39 Future gener­
ations are per se anonymous; we do not see 
them in our mind’s eye, and they are not 
able to affect us causally.40 That is why the 
present generation has a first-mover advan­
tage which allows it to optimise its own wel­
fare without considering the consequences 
for future generations.41 Gardiner calls this 
with reference to Hardin the ‘real tragedy 
of the commons’.42 Furthermore, the com­
plexity of long-term policies and the un­
certainty about future economic, societal, 
natural and political developments, policy 
impacts, future problems and the interests 
of future generations as well as the lacking 
salience of future problems, foster demo­
cratic presentism.43
Empowering future generations today
With reference to the all-affected principle, 
and facing democratic presentism’s disre­
gard of future generations’ interests, many 
scholars demand to consider future gener­
ations explicitly in today’s policies.44 Legge- 
wie criticises an untenable spatial as well as 
temporal divide between decision-makers 
on the one hand and those affected by these 
decisions on the other hand.45 According 
to Tremmel, this representation gap im­
pli es that conflicts of interest are decided 
by the majority of eligible voters, not by 
the majority of the affected.46 At the same
time, democracy is said to be the only 
decision-making regime that incorporates 
obligations towards future generations in 
the form of the all-affected principle as 
a guiding principle.47 It is the democratic 
all-affected principle that actually takes 
democratic presentism and reflective pa­
ternalism seriously, showing that the inter­
ests of future generations need to be taken 
into account already today, since they also 
are affected by today’s political decisions, 
but are usually politically neglected due to 
democratic presentism. In contrast, trying 
not to bind future people at all would be a 
mission impossible.
Reflective paternalism [...] is an 
attempt to take into account future 
generations’ future right to self-deter­
mination today, knowing that we will 
always affect their lives, regardless of 
whether we ignore or reflect that fact.
Is there any partial solution to this aporia 
of future generations’ self-determination? 
Consistent with the diagnoses above, several 
academics and activists call for democratic 
innovations designed to consider the inter­
ests of future generations institutionally. To 
meet the demands of the all-affected prin­
ciple, the presentist institutional incentive 
system of the democratic decision-making 
process needs to be modified. Gregory 
Kavka and Virigina Warren put it like this:
“ [I] n current democratic systems, no spe­
cial institutional mechanism exists to secure 
representation of future people’s interests, 
and representatives naturally focus their at­
tention on promoting the interests of those 
who have the power to vote them into, or 
out of, office; that is, present citizens. [...] 
[T]he interests of the nation’s future citi­
zens — whose lives will be critically affected, 
for better or worse, by present government 
action — [ought to be] directly represented 
in the democratic political process.”48
Hence it is somehow surprising that up 
to now, intergenerational inequality has 
been widely uncared for in large parts of po­
litical science and the wider social sciences. 
It is only in political philosophy, facilitated 
largely by John Rawls’s Theory o f  Justice, 
that the issue of how the interests of future 
generations can be taken into consideration 
politically is discussed today — as is exem­
plarily evident in the quote by Kavka and 
Warren (see above) or in the more contem­
porary works of, for example, Dieter Birn- 
bacher, Axel Gosseries, and Jorg Tremmel.49
Proposals for institutions for future 
generations
Literature is actually replete with more or 
less specific conceptual proposals of how 
the interests of future generations could be 
institutionally considered by the political 
systems of today. Since future generations 
themselves are, by definition, currently not 
among us, this is only possible through 
proxies or specific procedures. I will review 
these briefly in order to elucidate the full 
spectrum of possibilities for politically em­
powering the affected interests of future 
generations today.
Ombudsmen, Guardians, Trustees, Commis­
sioners, a n d  Councils f o r  Future Generations 
The first category of proposals includes con­
cepts of institutions that largely refer to the 
executive (i.e. the government) or have oth­
er, rather diffuse, addressees. They are called 
‘Guardians’, ‘Ombudsmen’ or ‘Trustees’. 
One of the most famous approaches is laid 
down by Edith Brown-Weiss in her book In 
Fairness to Future Generations.5CI Here, she 
introduces three principles and five obli­
gations of intergenerational fairness. For 
their implementation, she calls for the in­
stitutionalisation of a specific Guardian at 
the international level. Collins transfers this 
claim to the European Union.51 Brown- 
Weiss also argues in favour of Ombudsmen 
f o r  Future Generations.52 These Ombuds­
men are meant to review the implementa­
tion of laws that require the compliance to 
the three principles. They will act as com­
plaints offices for citizens, exert investiga­
tions, and call attention to threats to the 
planetary heritage. Furthermore, they are to 
be established in order to generally intro­
duce the interests of future generations into 
political decision-making processes and to 
inform both politics and society on their 
actions’ collateral impact on future gener­
ations. Ideally, the ombudsmen are to be 
established on all political levels, from local 
to international, and as special ombudsmen 
for different policy fields.
To meet the demands of the 
all-affected principle, the presentist 
institutional incentive system of the 
democratic decision-making process 
needs to be modified.
The figures of the Ombudsman and the 
Guardian are taken up by many proposals. 
For example, the Science and Environmen­
tal Health Network (SEHN) — together 
with the International Human Rights Clin­
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ic at Harvard Law School (IHRC) on the 
basis of a brief analysis of existing institu­
tions — has developed a blueprint, as it were, 
of such a guardian or ombudsman.53 Ac­
cording to their proposal, the Ombudsman 
for Future Generations would be obliged 
to ensure that all kinds of policies protect 
and promote the juridified environmental 
interests of future generations.54 In order 
to fulfil these tasks, impact assessments 
are to be conducted.55 The Ombudsman, 
appointed by the government, would fur­
thermore be allowed to access all necessary 
information and to speak before all relevant 
decision-making bodies.56 The affected par­
ties compulsorily would have to answer the 
Ombudsman’s evaluations and reports in 
written form, and the Ombudsman in turn 
would have to be given the opportunity to 
respond to their answers.57 The figure of 
the Guardian, also sketched by SEHN and 
IHRC, is quite similar to that of the om­
budsman.58 The Guardian is understood as 
more of a legal custodian who would be al­
lowed to legally represent future generations 
before governments and courts, however.59 
The concept of an ombudsman or guardian 
for future generations is also promoted by 
the World Future Council, which advocates 
their institutionalisation at the UN, the EU, 
and nation state levels.60 The task of this 
Ombudsman would be to introduce citizens’ 
requests concerning future generations into 
the political decision-making process and to 
take action him- or herself. The office and 
the incumbent would have to be legally in­
dependent, transparent, allowed to decide 
legally enforceable issues, and should be 
enjoying public support and access to infor­
mation and to all relevant stakeholders. Van 
Parijs, in particular, promotes the institu­
tionalisation of a Guardian to represent the 
interests of future generations in the politi­
cal decision-making process at the national 
level.61 This Guardian, in turn, is meant to 
be heard primarily by political actors and 
should be supported by a staff of independ­
ent scientists. Padilla argues in favour of 
Keepers o f  the Rights o f  Future Generations 
for all political levels.62 Those Keepers are 
intended to serve as agencies that monitor 
and sanction sustainability practices of the 
government and the economy. They are also 
tasked to manage financial compensations 
for the benefit of future generations and to 
promote and fund several sustainable prac­
tices.
Birnbacher promotes the Advocatory 
Representation o f  Future Generations in or­
der to introduce their interests in political 
planning decisions.63 Tremmel as well as 
Hubacek and Mauerhofer call for Advo­
cates that are appointed to represent the 
rights of future generations nationally and 
internationally.64 Gesang calls for Future 
Councils which are to be authorised to in­
itiate referendums and legislative initiatives 
and to gather and publish information.65 
Furthermore, they will have suspensory or 
extensive veto powers. The Councils’ staff 
is to be nominated by, in ter a lia , environ­
mental groups, universities and journalists’ 
associations and is expected to be voted into 
office by the regular electorate for a term of 
eight to ten years. Their task is to introduce 
future generations’ interests in today’s legis­
lative process.
Since future generations themselves 
are, by definition, currently not among 
us, [taking them into consideration 
institutionally] is only possible 
through proxies or specific procedures.
Thompson develops the concept of a Trus­
tee which could be institutionalised in the 
form of a commission (tribunate for pos­
terity) or a constitutional convention.66 
Echoing this article’s focus on the value 
of self-determination, the Trustee’s task is 
to represent the interest of future genera­
tions in the maintenance of the democratic 
process itself. Thompson suggests that the 
Trustee may intervene if the future capac­
ities of the democratic process are endan­
gered and that the Trustee may be allowed 
to request the government to assess the 
expected impact of its policies on poster­
ity’s democratic capacities. Furthermore, 
Thompson proposes that the Trustee may 
convene constitutional conventions in or­
der to adapt democratic rules to current 
needs, thereby constraining the dominion 
of the past over the present and the future. 
Shlomo Shoham, former Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Future Generations in 
Israel, calls for the institutionalisation of a 
“Sustainability Unit”, consisting of two en­
tities for substantial analysis and political 
action, respectively.67 Along the same line, 
Spangenberg and Dereniowska develop a 
so-called “archetype”, an independently 
funded Future Council with suspensory 
veto power against laws that are expected 
to be harmful to the future.68 Minsch et 
al. argue in support of a M inister o f  State 
f o r  Sustainability at the Federal Chancel- 
lery.69 Monaghan and Welburn add the 
idea to appoint an EU Commissioner f o r  the
Future whose task it would be to examine 
the long-term impact of the Commission’s 
proposals.70 For the UK, Roderick suggests 
to instate an advisory “O ffice f o r  Future 
Generations” within the executive.71 
For Germany, Rehbinder proposes an 
Ombudsman for future questions and an 
advisory Sustainability C ouncil.72 The lat- 
ter’s task would be to generate and organise 
future knowledge and to facilitate a societal 
discourse on the values and interests in rela­
tion to the future. The Council is supposed 
to consist of scientists and politicians who 
are appointed in separate procedures for a 
rather long term. Additionally, the Coun­
cil could be equipped with suspensory veto 
power for certain bills. The German Advi­
sory Council on Global Change (WBGU) 
opts — in its flagship report ‘World in Tran­
sition’ — for the idea of D eliberative Future 
Chambers, whose members are to be select­
ed by lot.73
In the 1990s, additional proposals for so- 
called E cological Councils were making 
round in Germany. Those Councils, as rep­
resentatives of future generations with the 
task to safeguard natural resources, were 
meant to be independent and predomi­
nantly advisory in form. Manifold variants 
of the ecological council were developed 
by Kirsch, Minsch et al., Rennings et al., 
Rux, and Weppler.74 Today, the German 
Foundation for the Rights of Future Gen­
erations (SRzG) advocates a parliam entary 
representation o ffu tu reg en era tion s .75 In Nor­
way, the youth organisation Spire has cam­
paigned for the institutionalisation of an 
Ombudsperson fo r  Future Generations since 
2012; and in the Netherlands there is a sim­
ilar initiative, too.76
Parliamentary an d  electora l reforms 
Besides guardians, ombudsmen and coun­
cils, there are also concepts that are especial­
ly tailored to the legislative. In 1996, An­
drew Dobson proposed the idea of a proxy 
electorate of sustainability experts that 
might elect a selection of candidates into 
parliament.77 A similar approach is pro­
moted by Wells.78 In his concept, charitable 
NGOs with a membership number above 
50,000 act as trustees of future generations 
and jointly constitute 10% of the electorate. 
Wells hopes that this would force the polit­
ical candidates to indirectly attract the votes 
of future generations. According to Ekeli, 
5% of the parliamentary seats ought to be 
reserved for representatives of future gener­
ations, either elected by the citizens or ap­
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pointed by the president.79 A qualified ma­
jority of these specia l representatives would be 
allowed to postpone harmful bills up to two 
years. A very similar suggestion was already 
made by Gregory Kavka and Virginia War­
ren in 1983, who also proposed to reserve 
a share of parliamentary seats for Represent­
atives o f  Future Generations to be elected 
either by the people or appointed by the 
Head of State.80 For South Korea, Yongseok 
likewise recommends to reserve 20% of the 
parliamentary seats for delegates of future 
generations.81 Those parliamentarians are 
meant to have a regular MP-status and are 
to be elected via separate party tickets. Every 
single voter would then have two votes, one 
for his own present generation and one for 
future ones. As an alternative, Ekeli intro­
duces the idea of sub-majority rules?1 Ac­
cording to this proposal, a qualified majority 
of all regular Members of Parliament would 
be allowed to suspend bills that are expected 
to harm the future until the next election, or 
alternatively be permitted to initiate a ref­
erendum on the issue at stake.
However, special seat shares and alternative 
electorates are not the only ways to reform 
parliaments for the assumed benefit of 
future generations. Roderick presents several 
options to modify the British Parliament.83 
First, one could establish a Third Parliamen­
tary Chamber f o r  Future G enerations with 
veto powers. Second, one could institution­
alise a Parliamentary C om m ittee f o r  the Fu­
ture that participates in regular law-making. 
Third, Roderick proposes a Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Future Generations with 
comprehensive competences. Institutional­
ising a strong Parliamentary Committee for 
Sustainability is also suggested by Minsch et 
al. for Germany.84 Monaghan and Welburn 
call for a committee within the European 
Parliament with the task of reviewing poli­
cies regarding their impact on future gener- 
ations.85 And Tremmel suggests expanding 
the three-power-model by a Fourth P ow er, 
a so-called future power which would rep­
resent future generations.86 According to 
his idea, this fourth power should merge 
the already-existing sustainability bodies 
at the German federal level, which are the 
German Council for Sustainable Develop­
ment, the German Advisory Council on 
Global Change, the Parliamentary Advisory 
Council on Sustainable Development and 
the German Advisory Council on the En­
vironment. Instead of exercising only veto 
powers, the fourth power would even be 
allowed to initiate bills.
Constitutions, courts, a n d  crim ina l law  
The conceptual proposals presented so far 
focus on the executive or the legislative. But 
of course constitutions and courts may also 
play important roles in empowering future 
generations today. There are many propos­
als of how to lay down the rights of future 
generations in constitutional articles.87 
Doeleman and Sandler consider the pro­
posal to codify quantified standards of nat­
ural goods that are to be sustained for future 
generations in the world’s constitutions.88 
Similarly, Ekeli advocates the constitution­
al codification of the preservation of critical 
natural resources for the benefit of the phys­
iological needs of future generations.89 
Göpel as well as Jodoin furthermore ar­
gue the case for the statutory offence of a 
“Crime Against Future G enerations’ that is 
expected to be prosecuted as a human rights 
violation.90 These crimes are military, eco­
nomic, cultural or scientific activities that 
were carried out or authorised despite the 
knowledge of their harmful and irreparable 
impacts on the health, security or survival 
of future generations, or conscious of their 
threat to the survival of whole species or 
ecosystems. Pelinka calls for a Ju d ic ia l High 
C ouncil that reviews parliamentary major­
ity decisions regarding infringements of 
the basic interests of future generations.91 
For the US, Tonn, as well as Pollard and 
Tonn, propose a Court of Future Genera­
tions which would be granted the right to 
file indictments to the Supreme Court.92 
Following Brown-Weiss, Birnbacher argues 
in favour of an International Court for the 
Future, based on an interpretation of the 
UN’s Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights that extends the declaration into the 
future.93 And finally, Iliescu makes a case 
for a Ju ry  fo r In tergen era tiona l Ju stice that 
reflects and weighs up for specific policies 
the interests of the current generation with 
the impacts on future generations.94
Proposals b eyond  the three branches of 
governm en t
Some authors imagine the political consid­
eration of future generations beyond the ex­
ecutive, legislative or judiciary. Thompson 
and Massarrat think about how to empower 
(international) NGOs that take long-term 
responsibility for long-term goals, engage in 
democracy and environmental protection 
and strengthen international civil society.95 
Monaghan and Welburn ask the EU to 
s upport groups which promote the inter­
ests of future generations.96 And Robert E.
Goodin hopes that voters and politicians 
could internalise the interests of future 
generations into their own preferences and 
consider them internally-deliberatively in 
their own reflections.97
M eta-policies
Besides the institutionalisation of organisa­
tions, the interests of future generations may 
also be taken into account by m eta-policies, 
i.e. special provisions that apply to the po­
litical decision-making process. MacKenzie 
is concerned with Policy Im pact Assessments 
for future generations.98 Krishnakumar calls 
for a “Representation R ein forcing Framework 
Statute” that would commit the US Con­
gress to review the impact of bills on, in ter 
alia, future tax payers.99 Hinrichs explains 
how to measure, with the help of In tergen ­
erational A ccounting, the impact of policy 
intentions on intergenerational fairness 
regarding public debt, taxation and redis­
tribution, i.e. the net payments of present 
and future citizens.100 Roderick would like 
to legally require the UK to conduct com­
parative Intergenerational Analysis for all 
policies.101
Proposals f o r  ex tensive revisions to our 
dem ocra tic in stitu tional systems 
In addition, there are proposals for exten­
sive revisions to our democratic institution­
al systems. For the US, Mank describes a so- 
called “Superagency ” within the executive to 
cast influences on all public authorities.102 
The agency’s task would be to represent 
future generations and to send legal repre­
sentatives to all organisations and assem­
blies. Tonn’s approach is even more radical 
by designing a future-oriented government 
almost from scratch.103 In his proposal, the 
already-existing American institutions are 
to be supplemented with a Court f o r  Future 
Generations (diagnostic function), a Fu­
ture Congress (decision function), a Future 
Administration (information and support 
function), a Coordination- and M edia­
tion -S ervice (implementation review and 
conflict management) and a Commission 
f o r  Future Problem s (issuing directives). In 
2006, Tonn and Hogan put forward a pro­
posal for the reform of the British House 
of Lords and the establishment of a Special 
Committee f o r  the Future that has a reporting 
function and is equipped with suspensory 
veto power.104 The new House of Lords shall 
be responsible for the heirs of the United 
Kingdom. Read would like to institutional­
ise a third parliamentary chamber, a Council
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o f  the Guardians f o r  Future Generations in 
the UK.105 The Council would be allowed 
to veto bills, analyse laws, review their im­
plementation and initiate bills by itself. Its 
members would be elected by lot for a sin­
gle term, and they would enjoy an advanced 
training for their task.
Besides the institutionalisation of 
organisations, the interests of future 
generations may also be taken into 
account by meta-policies, i.e. special 
provisions that apply to the political 
decision-making process.
Even for the US state of Hawaii there is a 
separate proposal of a Fourth Branch  which 
would be responsible for future genera- 
tions.106 This fourth branch is designed to 
research the future, develop social targets for 
Hawaii as benchmarks for law-making, in­
itiate public discourse, and generally watch 
out for the interests of future generations. 
Its members are to be selected equally by 
elections and by lot. Moreover, Caney de­
velops a five-fold package of institutions for 
the political representation of future gen­
erations: A Governmental M anifesto f o r  the 
Future (presentation of long-term trends, 
challenges and options), a Parliamentary 
C om m ittee f o r  the Future (reporting and 
evaluation of policies), a ' Visions f o r  the Fu­
ture’ Day (critical and public review of the 
Manifesto for the Future), an Independent 
Council for the Future (impact analysis and 
long-term trends; staffed by natural scien­
tists, social scientists and relevant human­
ities scholars) and Perform ance Indicators, 
employed by the Council and government 
bodies to document the attainment of long­
term targets and to evaluate long-term per- 
formance.107
A b r ie f assessment o f  the proposals 
It comes as no surprise that not all of these 
numerous conceptual proposals are suitable 
mitigation strategies from a political science 
point of view. It is conspicuous that some of 
the proposals are rather insensitive regard­
ing the conditions of and effects on the po­
litical system they are addressing. For exam­
ple, ombudsm en  are demanded for all kinds 
of political levels and different nations, in­
cluding Germany, but some countries (like 
Germany) do not have any tradition of 
high-level ombudsmanship to build upon. 
Furthermore, ombudsmen traditionally are 
persons or functions that usually receive 
complaints by affected parties (in most cas­
es ordinary citizens), investigate them, and
submit them to the respective government 
bodies. Since future generations cannot 
make any complaints today, the notions 
of a “guardian”, “trustee” or “advoca te” as 
examples also found in the literature are 
much more appropriate than the notion 
of an ombudsman, notwithstanding the 
fact that the competences and characteris­
tics of ombudsmen — such as the right of 
investigation, information, evaluation and 
independence — may be expedient. Admit­
tedly, some of the ombudsman concepts, 
referring back to the original idea, indeed 
want the ombudsman first and foremost to 
receive petitions of the citizens regarding 
the rights and interests of future genera­
tions. In these cases, however, it should not 
be taken for granted that ordinary citizens 
are more qualified and legitimised to speak 
in the name of future generations or are less 
presentist than any other actors.
Ekeli and others propose to elect a certain 
number of representatives o f  fu tu r e  gen era ­
tions to the parliament, or to employ certain 
sub-majority rules. Again, the political con­
ditions and effects of the proposal do not 
receive full consideration by the authors. 
The institutional incentives that affect these 
representatives of future generations do not 
differ significantly from the ones of regular 
MPs, and the additional (suspensory) veto 
rights and other instruments may lead to 
political gridlock and will not necessarily 
help future generations. The latter is a sig­
nificant danger of all approaches that aim to 
establish additional veto points and players, 
such as proposals to establish new chambers 
with veto power or to extensively revise the 
dem ocra tic in stitu tional system  of a country. 
Such undertakings may lead to even more 
“inheritance without choice” (Rose 1992) 
and constrain present and future demo­
cratic self-determination. Anyway, due to 
political-institutional inertia, such massive 
modifications are highly unlikely to be im­
plemented in contrast to humbler, incre­
mental approaches.
It is conspicuous that some of the 
proposals are rather insensitive 
regarding the conditions of and 
effects on the political system they 
are addressing.
On the downside, institutions that are too 
weak, having little resources and compe­
tences — such as mere advisory bodies — are 
at risk of becoming a substitute for the 
actual consideration of future generations’ 
interests in the political decision-making
process. Designing institutions to mitigate 
the aporia thus is a challenging balancing 
act and needs to take into account the spe­
cific political context.
Employing m eta-policies to introduce fu­
ture generations’ interests into the political 
decision-making process may fit smoothly 
into already-existing institutional arrange­
ments, but may require back-up staff-wise 
and competence-wise to be implemented, 
for comprehensive additional tasks such as 
sustainability impact assessments are quite 
resource-consuming if done properly. This 
is also why it might be wise to combine dif­
ferent institutions in order to mitigate the 
aporia. This may also include approaches 
that focus on the jud icia ry , which have their 
merits in being rather disengaged from pre­
sentist pressure. However, these approaches 
also may contribute to an undesirable polit­
icisation of the judiciary.
Examples of actual institutions for 
future generations
The list above shows that there are numer­
ous specific concepts of how to politically 
consider future generations today. Many 
of these concepts have models in the real 
world. One of the most famous institutions 
is the Hungarian Parliamentary Commis­
sioner (O mbudsman) f o r  Future Generations. 
The office of the Ombudsman was estab­
lished in 2008 and was downgraded by 
the right-wing Orban administration to a 
sub-office at the end of 2011, in the course 
of a constitutional reform.108 The Ombuds­
man looked especially after environmental 
issues and had several options to influence 
the political decision-making process: he 
was allowed to give his view in front of the 
parliament, to propose bills and to review 
and partially suspend certain political deci­
sions and administrative acts. He had to be 
consulted for all policy initiatives that con­
cern the environment. Moreover, he could 
bring to court already-existing laws that 
endangered the right to a healthy environ­
ment. He received petitions from citizens, 
was able to initiate investigations and made 
recommendations that had to be answered 
by the affected parties. He also maintained 
a large team and connected with the media 
and with NGOs.109 Today, the Ombuds­
man for Future Generations is still an im­
portant institution, but the position has lost 
its independence, as well as some of its staff 
and competences.110
The second model institution is the Knesset 
Commission f o r  Future Generations. The
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commission existed between 2001 and 
2006 in Israel and was officially abolished in 
2010, officially due to budget constraints. 
Unofficially, MPs increasingly found it 
problematic that an expert commission 
should be powerful enough to intervene in 
genuinely political decision-making pro- 
cesses.111 The Commissioner was allowed to 
review almost all bills and decide autono­
mously which bills were of concern for the 
interests of future generations. He could 
also join most of the debates in the Knesset 
Committees and issue written recommen­
dations that were able to delay the law­
making process considerably. The Commis­
sioner also participated actively in drafting 
new bills to the assumed benefit of future 
generations and enjoyed a permissive access 
to state information. Further tasks were pub­
lic relations activities and collaboration with 
academia, civil society and media actors.112 
Since this year Wales has a Future Gener­
ations Commissioner f o r  Wales. The Com­
missioner is provided with four kinds of 
political instruments. Firstly, advice, help, 
and support of public bodies regarding the 
attainment of Wales’ sustainable welfare 
targets. Secondly, research on sustainable 
development and welfare. Thirdly, inves­
tigations of public bodies regarding their 
activities in preserving the possibilities of 
future generations to fulfil their needs and 
in considering their actions’ long-term 
impacts. Based on her investigations, the 
Commissioner can issue public recom­
mendations that have to be answered by 
the addressed public body. The binding 
recommendations are limited to the realm 
of measures in accordance with the wel­
fare targets and the sustainability principle. 
Fourthly, the Commissioner is tasked with 
issuing several reports to the government 
and the parliamentary assembly.113
There are numerous specific concepts 
of how to politically consider future 
generations today. Many of these 
concepts have models in the real 
world.
A further, (at least formally) rather strong 
institution is the Belgian Federal C ouncil 
f o r  Sustainable D evelopm ent. Established in 
1997, the Council consists of representa­
tives of civil society, environmental groups, 
development assistance groups, academia, 
and federal and regional governments. The 
main task of the Council is to issue rec­
ommendations on sustainable politics at 
the request of state secretaries, the House
of Representatives, or the Senate. Alterna­
tively, the Council can prepare recommen­
dations on its own accord. The government 
has to report to the Council how it has im­
plemented the recommendations, and in 
case of deviations the government needs to 
justify its alternative line of action. More­
over, the Council serves as a discussion fo­
rum on sustainable development, conducts 
scientific research on questions of sustaina­
ble development, and promotes the partici­
pation of public and private organisations 
in achieving objectives of a sustainable de- 
velopment.114
Noteworthy, finally, is the so-called Sustain­
ability Check of the German Land (state) 
Baden-Württemberg. As a meta-policy, it 
legally prescribes in detail the assessment of 
the long-term impacts of regulatory initia­
tives. For this purpose, the sustainability in­
dicators and targets of the regional sustaina­
bility strategy are employed, and the results 
of the assessments are published.115
The role o f constitutions in the 
institutional empowerment o f future 
generations
Democratic presentism usually is a bar to 
the political consideration of future gener­
ations today. Constitutions as well as insti­
tutions such as those described above there­
fore may serve as credible commitments of 
the present politicians and citizens — i.e., as 
self-binding tools against the incentive not 
to consider the interests of future genera­
tions in today’s political decisions due to 
democratic presentism.116 
Several countries include provisions for 
future generation in their constitutions.117 
However, as Chilton and Versteeg recently 
discovered, constitutional rights are more 
likely to be respected if they are organisa­
tional rights, i.e. if  they help to establish 
organisations that have both the means 
and the incentive to protect the respec­
tive rights and thereby making them self- 
reinforcing.118 Since future generations 
themselves are not here today, it is plausible 
to establish institutions that at least partially 
compensate this drawback and help enforce 
their constitutional and/or moral rights. 
If the existence of such institutions is pre­
scribed in the constitution, as was at least 
indirectly the case in Hungary, the future 
rights of future generations as well as the en­
forcing institutions gain both a solid super- 
majoritarian legal basis and normative 
power in relation to other political actors. 
Constitutional entrenchment then would
strengthen the commitment of politics and 
society towards future generations without 
substantially further reducing the amount 
of direct self-determination future genera­
tions will enjoy. Constitutions thus could 
have two supporting roles in mitigating the 
aporia: first, to provide the very legal and 
institutional prerequisites for present and 
future democratic self-determination (how­
ever constrained), and second, to authorita­
tively enshrine the rights of and obligations 
to future generations and thereby backing 
up other institutions that are designed to 
introduce the interests of future generations 
into today’s decision-making process. The 
existence of such institutions may also be 
laid down in the constitution.
Constitutions [...] may serve as 
credible commitments of the present 
politicians and citizens -  i.e., as 
self-binding tools against the incen­
tive not to consider the interests of 
future generations [...].
Empirically, the constitutional entrench­
ment of institutions empowering future 
generations is rather vague, if it exists at 
all. In Hungary, the Ombudsman referred 
to the constitutional right to a healthy en­
vironment, since future generations were 
not explicitly mentioned in the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. Nonetheless, the 
Constitutional Court decided that the 
state is obliged to sustain the quality of the 
natural living conditions for future gener­
ations. Furthermore, it claimed that the 
fundamental right to live and human dig­
nity generate an obligation for the state to 
provide institutional protection for the liv­
ing conditions of future generations.119 In 
Israel, the legal basis of the Parliamentary 
Commission for Future Generations was 
laid down in the Knesset Law that regulates 
the modes of operations of the Israeli parlia­
ment. In contrast, the Future Generations 
Commissioner for Wales is specified in the 
Well-Being of Future Generations (Wales) 
Bill, which is a regular statute.120 In the first 
bill regarding Welsh Devolution, it is codi­
fied that the Welsh Assembly has to develop 
and track a sustainability plan.121 The same 
is true for the Government of Wales Act of 
2006.122 In Belgium, the Council also works 
on the basis of a regular statute.123 Never­
theless, the Belgian  constitution (art. 7) 
generally states that the government strives 
for sustainable development and considers 
the solidarity between the generations. The 
sustainability check of Baden-W ürttemberg
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is legally based on the standing orders of the 
government and an administrative regula- 
tion.124
Mitigating the aporia with institutions 
for future generations
As I have already mentioned, the full 
self-determination of future generations 
is an impossible endeavour, for we always 
will affect future generations with our 
present-day political decisions, independ­
ent of whether or not we are aware of this. 
More basically, looking at world history 
and longer time frames, both the value of 
self-determination and democracy should 
not be taken for granted, so their long-term 
promotion und stabilisation seems to be a 
necessary endeavour, and constitutions can 
be seen as useful tools in doing so. 
Furthermore, to approximate the norma­
tive standard of the all-affected principle 
nevertheless, I suggested the concept of 
reflective paternalism. Therefore we need 
to consciously consider the interests of 
future generations in today’s political de­
cision-making process. For that purpose, 
many concepts and some real-world cases of 
institutions empowering future generations 
today were presented briefly. I argued that 
constitutionally prescribing the existence of 
such institutions would foster the impact 
potential of the respective institutions and 
facilitate at least proxy self-determination of 
future generations. From these perspectives, 
constitutional and institutional self-bind­
ing and the binding of future generations 
seem to be legitimate and, to paraphrase a 
bon m ot of Churchill, to be the worst form 
of future generations’ self-determination, 
except for all the others, as aporiae are not 
fully dissolvable.
When it comes to institutionalising a spe­
cific institution for future generations in a 
specific country, there are no one-size-fits- 
all-models but a variety of more or less suit­
able components that became visible in the 
descriptions above. In com petitive p o litica l 
systems like many majoritarian democracies 
and in countries with a dominant culture of 
a separation of powers, independent over­
sight agencies with monitoring tools and 
suspensory vetoes might be a good idea, 
as long as they do not lead to a gridlock of 
the system. In contrast, internal deliberative 
parliamentary committees with a right 
to initiate bills may work in consensual 
dem ocra cies that emphasise cooperation. On 
the other hand, to install an ombudsperson 
for future generations in a country with
no tradition in ombudsman schem es might 
hamper the acceptance and the influence of 
the new institution. In econom ised  p o lit ica l 
systems that rely on expert panels, impact 
assessments and cost-benefit-analysis, advi­
sory bodies such as councils and meta-pol­
icies such as sustainability checks and in­
tergenerational accounting may fit into the 
system. The design of the institution should 
also take into account which of the three 
powers is politically dominant in a particu­
lar political system in order to get su fficien t 
access to the p o lit i ca l decision-m ak ing process. 
Furthermore, a su fficien t provision  w ith  
finan cia l, s ta ff a n d  know ledge resources and  
infrastructures is crucial, since the tasks to 
research the interests of and the impacts on 
future generations are especially challenging 
because of to the high level of uncertainty.
When it comes to institutionalis­
ing a specific institution for future 
generations in a specific country, 
there are no one-size-fits-all-models 
but a variety of more or less suitable 
components [...].
Overall, it also may be promising to include 
non-profit c iv i l society actors in the overall 
design of the empowerment of future gen­
erations, for they could alleviate democratic 
presentism and support the generation of 
a broad acceptance of the institutionalised 
idea of politically considering future gen­
erations already today. They may also be 
helpful to give more attention to the issue 
of intergenerational justice and may help 
to hold institutions for future generations 
accountable. Youth participa tion  may yield 
some legitimising symbolic power, since 
the future selves of the young share many 
well-understood self-interests with the first 
future generation. However, it should be 
noted that young people are not per se less 
presentist than the old ones.125 
Empirically, civil society organisations 
sometimes play a central role in promot­
ing institutions for future generations, for 
example in Hungary where the NGO Véd- 
egylet (Protect the Future) finally succeed­
ed with its long-standing campaign to in­
stitutionalise the ombudsman.126 In Wales 
and in Baden-Württemberg there were 
broad participation processes that were 
initiated by the governments. The Belgian 
Federal Council is staffed with many rep­
resentatives of civil society organisations. 
In contrast, the Knesset Commission was 
launched by a single Member of Parliament 
who convinced his fellow MPs completely
without any civil society support.127 How­
ever, this remains an exception.
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